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Over the last year, India witnessed reserve accumulation in excess of $100 billion on the 
back of strong capital flows looking to take advantage of the interest rate differential and 
a strong rupee. Given the central bank’s preference for safety and liquidity, at the expense 
of return, while investing these reserves, the profitability of holding such large volume of 
reserves is being increasingly questioned. This paper estimates the volume of excess 
reserves held in India and evaluates the cost of holding these reserves by considering 
various alternative use of the resources employed in building up reserves.  
 
It is hoped that this study will contribute to an informed discussion on this important 
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Most of the existing literature has used single reserve adequacy measures to evaluate the 
volume of excess reserves. In this paper, we employ empirical methods to generate a 
comprehensive reserve adequacy measure, incorporating the various objectives of 
holding reserves, and compare the actual reserve accumulation experience of various 
emerging markets with the prediction of our empirical model. Using this comprehensive 
reserve adequacy measure, we calculate the cost of holding excess reserves for India by 
looking at three different alternative uses of resources. We find that India is foregoing as 
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With the collapse of the Bretton Woods, the pressure on industrial countries to 
accumulate reserves eased as they moved to flexible exchange rate regimes and overcame 
the problem of “original sin” i.e., the inability to borrow from abroad in domestic 
currencies. On the other hand, emerging market policymakers have been struggling to 
define adequate reserve levels, and have been typically motivated by the principle of 
“non-satiability” or “more-is-better” while dealing with international reserves. In the last 
decade and a half, developing countries, particularly of East and South Asia, have built 
massive stockpile of international reserves. Emerging economies like China, South 
Korea, Russia, and India have accumulated reserves in excess of $2.5 trillion.
1 Such 
massive scale of reserve accumulation has raised several questions about the cost of 
holding high volume of reserves as most of it is held in the form of low-yield government 
bonds. 
 
Prior to investigating the cost of holding reserves, it is important to understand the factors 
influencing the demand for international reserves. In most countries, the central bank 
maintains a stockpile of international reserves to meet imbalances in current account 
financing, cover short-term debt obligations, prevent excessive volatility in the exchange 
rate etc. In line with these objectives, the empirical literature points out that the demand 
for international reserves is based on a number of structural variables like economic size, 
current account openness, capital account openness, exchange rate regime, financial 
depth, etc.  
 
Given the above objectives of reserve holding, every country would like to hold an 
adequate amount of international reserves to meet the needs mentioned above, and any 
holding in excess of that can only be deemed as “excess reserves”. However most of the 
literature evaluating the cost of holding reserves has focused either on entire reserve 
holding or reserves holdings in excess of a single adequacy measure like three to four 
months of import cover. The implicit assumptions behind such computations are that 
holding international reserves do not generate any benefits or that they are held only to 
meet a single objective like current account financing. Such a perspective fitted well a 
world where financial markets were not integrated and trade openness reflected 
countries’ vulnerability to external shocks i.e., the Bretton Woods period. However, with 
increased financial integration in recent years, the emerging markets have increased their 
exposure to volatile short-term inflows of capital that are subject to frequent sudden stops 
and reversals.
2 Consequently, emerging markets have increased their demand for 
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international reserves due to a desire for self-insurance against exposure to future sudden 
stops. 
 
Greater financial integration is also associated with an increase in exchange rate 
volatility. Active international reserve management lowers the real exchange rate 
volatility, which in turn results in a smoother output and potentially higher growth rate. In 
a number of emerging markets, reserve accumulation is a by-product of the desire of the 
policymakers to keep the exchange rate undervalued and promote export-led growth. 
 
Based on the above precautionary motives of holding international reserves, it would be 
more appropriate to consider reserves, held over and above what is required to meet the 
precautionary demands, as excess reserves. In this paper we use empirical methods to 
analyze the potential factors influencing the demand for international reserves in 
emerging markets. Using the results of our empirical analysis, we calculate the predicted 
volume of reserves and call the difference between actual and predicted volume of 
reserves as excess reserves. Thereafter, we focus on India and calculate the cost of 
holding these excess reserves. We consider three alternate uses of the resources used in 
building up the stockpile of reserves i.e., financing physical investment, reducing private 
sector’s short-term external commercial borrowing and lowering public sector debt. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 undertakes a brief review of the 
existing literature. Section 3 highlights the pattern of reserve accumulation since the 
1950s and makes cross country comparison of major reserve adequacy indicators. Section 
4 enumerates the main benefits of reserve accumulation in various emerging markets. In 
Section 5, we analyze the main determinants of reserve holding using empirical methods 
and compare the reserve accumulation experience of major emerging markets vis-à-vis 
the predictions of our model. Section 6 focuses on India and highlights the cost of 
holding excess reserves using various alternative uses of resources. Finally, Section 7 
lists out the main conclusions of the study. 
 
2.  Brief Review of Existing Literature 
 
Several papers have looked at the cost of holding international reserves. These papers 
have reached very different conclusions depending on the measure used to calculate the 
opportunity cost of holding these reserves as well as the volume of international reserves 
on which the cost is calculated. Iyoha (1976) and Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) treat the 
opportunity cost as the inverse of the discount rate and finds that demand for international 
reserves varies inversely with the opportunity cost. However, Shinkai (1979) points out 
that use of domestic discount rate to calculate the opportunity cost of holding reserves is 
erroneous as most the of reserves are held in dollar denominated assets. As a result, it 
makes sense to use the difference between returns on such assets and a country-specific 
interest rate, which measures the net gain (inverse cost) of holding reserves instead of 
investing the equivalent sum within the country. Most of these papers look at the entire 
stockpile of reserves thereby assuming that reserve holdings do not generate any benefits 
apart from the nominal return.  
   3
Another measure usually employed to capture the cost of holding reserves is the return on 
investment in physical capital. Neely (2000), Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992b) and Baker 
and Walentin (2001) assume that if assets were not held as reserves they would be 
available to fund domestic investment in physical capital. These papers conclude that the 
increase in reserves represents an enormous cost to the developing nations as they are 
foregoing domestic investment in either physical or human capital. Baker and Walentin 
(2001) point out that such costs exceed 1% of GDP and possibly 2% of GDP for many 
developing economies. 
 
In a recent paper, Rodrik (2006) terms excess reserves as reserves held over and above 
what is required to meet three months of import. Using this rule, Rodrik (2006) finds that 
by investing resources in accumulation of reserves, instead of reducing private sector’s  
short-term borrowing, the developing nations are losing about 1% of their GDP. 
 
On the other hand, there exists a large volume of empirical literature indicating that in a 
modern economy reserves are demanded for a variety of reasons apart from financing 
imports. These include maintaining a certain level of indebtedness, adhering to a 
particular exchange rate regime, depth of the financial market, degree of capital account 
openness etc.  
 
According to Burke and Lane (2001), apart from trade openness, financial depth and 
external indebtedness also influence the demand for international reserves. Aizenman and 
Marion (2004) point out that the size of international transactions, their volatility, 
exchange rate arrangement and political stability are some of the key determinants of 
international reserve holdings in most of East Asia. They also point out that countries 
characterized by sovereign risk, costly tax collection and large inelastic fiscal liabilities 
are likely to exhibit greater precautionary demand for international reserves. Using a 
simple empirical model, Edison (2003) shows that real GDP per capita, the population 
level, ratio of imports to GDP and volatility of the exchange rate are found to be 
statistically significant determinants of reserve holdings.  
 
The pattern of reserve accumulation has changed over the period of time. Aizenman and 
Marion (2004) point out that in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, the emerging 
economies of Asia increased their level of reserves for self-insurance performance. A 
similar increase in reserve holding was also observed in Latin America after the debt 
crisis of the early 1980s. Focusing on Korea, Aizenman et al. (2003) find evidence of a 
structural break in the pattern of reserve holding post-Asian crisis after which financial 
openness and external indebtedness have become significant and a strong predictor of 
reserve holdings, while trade openness loses some significance after the crisis. 
 
3.  India’s Reserve Accumulation 
 
Prior to the time of financial globalization, countries used to hold reserves mainly to 
manage foreign exchange demand and supply arising from current account transactions. 
India was no exception to this rule. It followed a restrictive foreign trade policy and used 
its reserves for essential items like petroleum and food grains. Since 1991, there has been   4
a major shift in the external policy with import substitution giving way to export 
promotion. For this policy to succeed, sufficiency of international reserves was a major 
requirement.  
 
Figure 1 looks at the growth of international reserves in India since 1950-51. It can be 
seen that the volume of international reserves was almost stagnant from 1950-51 to 1990-
91. During this period it grew marginally from $2.16 billion to $5.83 billion. However, 
since then India’s holding of international reserves has increased to over $270 billion, till 
December 2007. Acceleration in reserve accumulation was first witnessed in 1993, when 
India adopted the market-based system of exchange rates. In the mid and late 1990s, the 
growth rate of accumulation of reserves slackened a little bit. From 2001 there was again 
a spurt in this growth rate, which coincided with a current account surplus for the first 
time since 1978. The recent growth in international reserve holdings is on the back of 
unprecedented foreign capital inflow coming in to take advantage of the interest rate 
differential and a strong rupee. 
 

































































































































































International Reserves International; Reserves Minus Gold  
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics 2006-07 
 
In Figure 2, we can see the change in the number of months of imports that could be 
financed by international reserves as well as the ratio of short-term debt to international 
reserves. As a result of the rapid accumulation of reserves, India’s holding of 
international reserves in 2006-07 could finance more than a year’s imports. This is in 
sharp contrast to June 1991 when India had reserves only to finance less than three weeks 
of imports. At that point, the Government of India had to ship 47 tonnes of gold to the 
Bank of England to secure a loan of $415 million before the funds were arranged from 
the International Monetary fund (IMF) to ride out the crisis. Today, India has a   5
comfortable cushion in the case it suffers a terms of trade shock or a sudden reversal of 
capital flow. This massive accumulation of reserves has also meant that the ratio of short-
term debt to international reserves has witnessed a steep decline from nearly 150% in 
1990-91 to well below 6% in 2006-07.
3 Thus, India is well prepared to cover its short-
term external obligations. 
 
Comparing India’s holding of international reserves to some of the standard international 
reserve adequacy benchmarks, we get the sense that India’s reserve holdings are more 
than adequate. The Greenspan-Guidotti rule stresses that sufficient international reserves 
must be maintained to meet external obligations for about a year, without any external 
assistance. In India, the current level of international reserves is almost 20 times the 
short-term external obligations. Also as stated earlier, there is a general consensus that 
import cover of reserves should be around 3-4 months. Most industrialized countries have 
an import cover of around three months. Given the weak financial system, limited access 
to international credit markets in the face of a crisis and other macroeconomic indicators 
associated with developing countries, these countries should hold additional reserves. 
Again on this count, India is comfortably placed with more than a year’s import cover. 
 



















































































































































Ratio of Short-term Debt to International Reserves Import Cover of International Reserves  
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics 2006-07 
                                                 
3  Short-term debt has been redefined since 2005-06 to include suppliers’ credit up to 180 days. However, 
to maintain consistency we stick to the original definition. As per the new definition the ratio of short 
term debt to the foreign exchange reserves stood at  12.5%  as at end-March 2005, but increased slightly 
to 12.9% as at end-March 2006 and further to 13.2% at end-March 2007, but declined to 12.4% at the 





















Reserve hoarding is not a phenomenon that has been unique to India. Most of the South 
East Asian as well as Latin American economies have also been indulging in this kind of 
behaviour. This has been the primary response to currency crises these economies faced 
in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 3 exhibits some of the key reserve adequacy indicators for major emerging 
economies. It can be clearly seen that, barring Argentina and Chile, most of the emerging 
economies have witnessed a significant increase in their import cover of international 
reserves as well as the ratio of international reserves to M2. Again, Chile was the only 
major developing country that did not experience a rise in the ratio of international 
reserves to GDP. Finally, all the major developing countries saw a fall in the ratio of 
short-term debt to international reserves. The fall was again smallest for Argentina and 
Chile. 
 
Figure 3: Cross Country Comparison of Reserve Adequacy Measures 
 
 











(a) Import Cover of International Reserves                (b) Ratio of Short-term Debt to 
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Comparing India’s performance with other emerging economies it can be clear seen that 
India has done remarkably well. Figure (a) shows that in terms of import cover of 
international reserves, India is better covered than most other major emerging markets. 
The only major emerging market with a higher import cover is China. Similarly, 
according to Figure (b), India is well placed in terms of ratio of short-term debt to 
international reserves. At 6%, this ratio is also smaller than most other developing 
countries. Even with the other two indicators, India is relatively comfortably placed. In 
terms of ratio of international reserves to GDP, India is behind economies like China, 
Thailand, Russia and Malaysia but ahead of most Latin American economies. On the 
other hand, at 25.53%, the ratio of international reserves to M2 in India is higher than 
China and Brazil but lower than most of the Latin American economies and Korea. 
 
4.  Benefits of Holding Reserves 
 
Feldstein (1999) points out that the Asian crisis of 1997 has clearly shown that emerging 
economies must learn to protect themselves from such disaster. Neither the IMF, nor the 
‘new global financial architecture’ will prevent such crisis from occurring. Even 
countries practicing sound macroeconomic policies are not immune to such crisis as they 
can be hit by contagion from anywhere. The key to self-protection is liquidity, and 
countries that have substantial international liquidity in the form of large foreign 
exchange reserves are less likely to be the object of a currency attack. 
 
Another potential benefit of adequate reserves is that it provides self-insurance against 
sudden stops and adverse fiscal shocks. Sudden stops are typically associated with large 
reduction in the flow of capital followed by major exchange rate depreciation leading to 
significantly lower rates of return, investment and growth. International reserves help 
mitigating the effects of such sudden stops. Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992b) argue that 
international reserves reduce the probability and the intensity of an output drop due to a 
sudden stop. Moreover, Aizenman and Marion (2004) point out those countries facing 
increased sovereign risk, high taxation costs and characterized by large inelastic fiscal 
liabilities also find it optimal to hold large precautionary reserve balances. Countries 
would also hold large precautionary balances of international reserves if they attach more 
weight to bad outcomes than good ones. 
 
Reserves also help to lower the real exchange rate volatility, induced by terms of trade 
shocks. It has been widely argued that exchange rate volatility has an adverse impact on a 
country’s growth. In a recent paper, Aghion et al. (2006) find that in countries 
characterized by low level of financial development, exchange rate volatility has a 
negative impact on the growth rate. Thus any mechanism that reduces the volatility of 
exchange rate will enhance the growth performance of an economy. 
 
Dooley et al. (2003) point out that the growing stockpiles of international reserve can be 
attributed to a deliberate strategy, which facilitates growth by maintaining an undervalued 
exchange rate. This would imply that every time there is pressure on the domestic 
currency to appreciate, i.e., traders want to sell foreign currency and buy domestic   8
currency, the central bank intervenes by printing domestic currency and buying up all the 
foreign currency, which translates into additional reserves. 
 
Looking specifically at the Indian case, Patnaik (2005) finds that in recent years there 
have been two episodes where the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has actively engaged in 
currency trading. The first one was in 1993-95, when there was a huge capital surge into 
the country as a result of liberalization of portfolio investment. However, from January 
1993 to July 1995, there was no change in the nominal exchange rate, which was fixed at 
slightly below Rs. 31.50 during this period. To ensure that the Indian rupee does not 
appreciate, the RBI had to absorb the excess foreign reserves, as a result of which the 
stockpile of international reserves nearly tripled from $6.7 billion in March 1993 to $19.5 
billion in July 1995. 
 
The second episode of currency trading was primarily due to a reversal in the capital 
account. It began in October 2001 and continued till June 2004. In 2001-02, the current 
account registered a surplus for the first time since 1978 and this had implications for the 
currency market. During this period, the RBI added more than $74 billion to its coffers. 
The RBI again was interested in preventing the rupee from appreciating and intervened 
actively to achieve this objective. In fact during the first few months of this episode i.e., 
till May 2002, the rupee actually depreciated from Rs. 47.97 against the US dollar to Rs. 
49.03. The RBI allowed the rupee to appreciate from June 2002, when the reserves had 
crossed the $55 billion mark. The rupee continued to appreciate till March 2004, after 
which it depreciated marginally. The intervention in 1993-95 was associated with a small 
increase in the share of exports as a percentage of GDP from less than 10% to over 11% 
during this time. The intervention during the second episode was associated with a much 
more impressive performance of Indian exports, which increased from 13% of GDP to 
well over 19%. 
 
5.  Determinants of Reserves 
 
Before looking at the costs of additional reserve holding it is imperative to know how 
much reserves a country needs to hold. Generally, several rule of thumb measures like 
three months of imports, Guidotti-Greenspan measure etc. have been cited as possible 
benchmark of reserve holding. However, in recent years, several studies like Aizenman 
and Lee (2006), Aizenman and Marion (2004) and Burke and Lane (2001) have pointed 
that a country’s demand for international reserves depends on a number of variables and 
not just on the import bill and short-term debt. In this section, we use empirical methods 
to study the determinants of cross-country variation in the level of international reserves 
from 1980 to 2005. On the basis of the empirical analysis we would like to calculate the 
predicted demand for international reserves and thus be able to calculate the volume of 
excess reserves held by various countries. 
 
The existing literature identifies a range of variables that influence reserve holdings. We 
look at a sample of 167 countries over a 25 year period, from 1980-2005. The dependent 
variable is the ratio of reserves minus gold to GDP. The reserves include special drawing 
rights, reserves of IMF members held by the Fund, and holdings of foreign exchange   9
under the control of monetary authorities. Data on reserve holdings and GDP are taken 
from the World Development Indicators. 
 
We consider several control variables that have been found in the literature as being 
principal determinants of reserve holding. The first control variable is a measure of real 
income per capita, which acts as a measure of the overall development of the economy 
and captures a wide range of factors that affect reserve holdings. Owing to the large 
variation in this variable across the sample of countries, the log of real per capita GDP, 
instead of level, is used.  
 
Another variable, which has a strong impact on reserve holdings is openness to trade. 
Reserves are viewed as financing option of last resort in covering import demand. Thus, 
there is a natural link between trade openness and international reserves. Countries with 
higher import to GDP ratio are expected to hold more reserves to tide them over during a 
crisis. We measure trade openness by the share of imports in GDP. There is a close 
association between domestic financial development and exposure to external crises. To 
the extent that the liabilities of the domestic sector are partly denominated in foreign 
currency, financial deepening should be matched by an increase in international reserves. 
We measure financial depth with the ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to GDP. Data 
on imports and M2 are also taken from the World Development Indicators.  
 
The volume of reserves is also crucially affected by the existing exchange rate regime. A 
country with a currency peg is likely to hold more reserves either to defend against 
attacks on the exchange rate or as a consequence of resisting an appreciation of the 
domestic currency. On the other hand, in a flexible exchange rate regime, the exchange 
rate can freely float to reflect market reality and hence such a country is likely to hold 
fewer reserves. 
 
To control for exchange rate regime, we use the exchange rate index formulated by Levy- 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), which is a de facto classification based on data on 
exchange rates. The index ranges from 1 to 5 with a lower number implying a more 
flexible exchange rate regime.
4 
 
The degree of capital account liberalization is another variable that influences the 
precautionary motive of capital account liberalization. As a country opens up to greater 
capital flows, it needs to put in place adequate safeguards to protect itself against sudden 
stops. Thus, greater capital account openness is likely to be associated with higher 
volume of reserves. We measure capital account openness using Chin-Ito index 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). The index is the first principal component of the 
binary variables pertaining to cross-border financial transactions, based on the IMF’s 
categorical enumeration reported in Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This is a compilation of four dichotomous variables 
accounting for restrictions on capital account transaction, current account transactions, 
                                                 
4 Another popular exchange rate regime measure is the one created in Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
However, this measure ends in 2001 and is thus not suitable for our purpose. 
   10
requiring surrendering of export proceeds, and the presence of multiple exchange rate. 
Since these four binary variables account for the degree of control than openness, Chinn 
and Ito flip their values and construct an index based on the standardized principal 
components. The index ranges from −1.7 to 2.7 and a higher value of the index indicates 
greater financial openness. 
 
Aizenman and Marion (2004) point out that political uncertainty will influence a 
country’s strategy regarding holding of reserves. Suppose alternatively the government in 
a country has a ‘tough’ administration that ensures responsible fiscal behaviour and a 
‘soft’ administration that behaves opportunistically in appropriating and allocating 
resources to special interest groups with high discount rates. A ‘soft’ administration 
would want to increase the consumption of special interest groups and reduce 
international reserve holdings and accumulate international debt to achieve that. On the 
other hand, a ‘tough’ administration would be reluctant to hold lot of reserves if there is a 
high probability that it will lose power in the near future and the future administration 
will be ‘soft’ and grab the rewards for the special interest rate groups. Thus, political 
instability can reduce the level of reserve holdings below the level supported by 
efficiency considerations. We use the political stability index developed by Intra Country 
Risk Guide. The index is made up of variables like government stability, socioeconomic 
conditions, conflicts, law and order etc. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with a higher 
number indicating a more politically stable regime.  
 
Finally, we also take into account the external indebtedness of the country and measure it 
using the ratio of external debt to the GDP. Data on external debt is taken from the World 
Development Indicators. We also include a series of dummy variables that indicate the 
behavior of the Asian and the Latin American economies after the Tequila Crisis of 1994 
and the Asian crisis of 1997. The crisis dummies intend to capture the change in the 
reserve holding behaviour of these economies after they were hit by crises. 
 
The empirical model is given by following equation 
 
0 1 12 23 34 45 56 67 7 it it it it it it it it i t Y XXXXXXX ι α ββ ββ ββ βυ ε =+ + + + + + + + +       (1) 
 
where i refers to the country and t represents the time period. Here Y is the dependent 
variable, measured as ratio of reserves (minus gold) to GDP. Among the explanatory 
variable, X1 is log of per capita GDP, X2 is a measure of trade openness, X3 is a measure 
of exchange rate regime, X4 is a measure of capital account openness, X5 measures 
financial depth, X6 is a measure of political stability and X7 is the ratio of short-term debt 
to the GDP. 
 
In our sample of countries, a Woolridge test for autocorrelation, suggests the presence of 
first order serial correlation. In the presence of autocorrelation, the error term in equation 
(1) can be written as 
 
1 it i it it ε ρε µ − = +                (2)   
 
In the literature, there are several ways to estimate the model in the presence of serial 
correlation. One can use a feasible GLS with AR1 correlation. However, this procedure   11
has been criticized for underestimating the standard errors. The panel corrected standard 
error estimates, which uses Prais-Winstein regression, addresses this problem. It assumes 
that the disturbances are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. 
The panel corrected standard error estimates allow for first order correlation, AR(1), with 
a common coefficient of the AR(1) process across all the panels, ( , i i ρ ρ = ∀ ), as well as 
a specific coefficient of the AR(1) process for each panel, ( , i ij ρ ρ ≠ ≠ ). 
 
Table 1 displays the results of the Prais-Winstein regression with panel-specific 
autocorrelation coefficients. We focus on all the countries in our sample as well as 
emerging market economies. Across the entire sample, log of per capita GDP has a 
positive and significant impact on reserve holding. Richer countries tend to have higher 
reserve holdings. Trade openness also exerts a strong positive impact on reserve holding 
thereby highlighting the precautionary motive where countries having higher share of 
trade want to hold enough resources to be able to finance their imports.  
 
Exchange rate regime also shows up as a significant predictor of international reserve 
holding. Across all specifications for the full sample it has a significant positive impact 
on reserves. According to the exchange rate regime measure used, a higher number 
indicates less flexible regime. Thus, countries with fixed exchange rate regime tend to 
accumulate greater reserves. Like trade openness, capital account openness also 
positively affects international reserve holdings, although the effect is not significant 
across all specifications. Thus, countries that opened up the capital account tend to hold 
greater reserves to protect themselves against episodes of sudden stops. 
 
We also find that greater financial depth tends to have a positive influence on reserve 
holdings. In many countries, the liabilities of the financial sector are denominated in 
foreign currencies and this is reflected in higher volume of reserves. Political stability 
also has the expected positive impact on reserve holding but the impact is not significant 
across all specifications. Finally, we find that the extent of external indebtedness has no 
significant influence on reserve holdings. 
 
Among the dummy variables, only the dummy for Asian economies after the Asian crisis 
has a strong positive and significant effect on reserves, implying that post-Asian crisis, 
the Asian economies made a deliberate attempt to bolster their reserve holdings to 
prevent another such attack. 
 
When we focus only on emerging markets we find that per capita GDP, along with 
political stability and external indebtedness, are no longer significant predictors of the 
volume of reserves. However, both trade and capital account openness, along with 
exchange rate regime and financial depth, continue to be the major determinants of 
volume of reserves. 
 
Next, we use the above empirical model to predict the demand for international reserves 
for various emerging countries and groups. In particular, we use the regression in Column 
(IX) of Table 1 to calculate the volume of reserves predicted by our model. If the actual 
reserves exceed predicted reserves then the difference is termed as excess reserves.   12
Table 1:  Prais Winstein Estimates with Panel Specific Correlation Coefficient 
 
  (I) (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX) 
  Full Sample of Countries  Emerging Market Economies 
Per Capita GDP  0.917***  0.687*** 0.254 1.409*** 0.84  0.862 1.066 4.045*** 2.444*
 [3.82]  [2.86] [0.75] [3.24] [1.39] [1.19] [1.48] [4.40] [1.90]
Import Share  0.119***  0.144*** 0.181*** 0.150*** 0.268***  0.254*** 0.163*** 0.114** 0.163***
 [12.69]  [14.35] [11.26] [8.44] [9.47] [8.05] [3.92] [2.41] [3.46]
Exchange Rate 
Regimes   0.136** 0.280*** 0.273***   0.093 0.072 0.094 0.235
   [2.37] [3.50] [3.13]   [0.78] [0.51] [0.59] [1.13]
Capital Account 
Openness   0.533*** 0.548*** 0.549***   0.540** 0.467* 0.502* 0.790***
   [4.17] [3.27] [2.69]   [2.09] [1.85] [1.90] [3.05]
Financial Depth    0.090*** 0.116***   0.112*** 0.134*** 0.178***
   [6.08] [5.71]   [3.84] [4.19] [7.68]
Political Stability    0.032* 0.059***   0.046 0.038 -0.056
   [1.92] [2.80]   [1.58] [1.10] [1.11]
Short-term 
Indebtedness   0.004   0.022 0.049***
   [0.94]   [1.48] [3.64]
Observations 3633  2958 1830 1455 585  516 440 388 168
Number of countries  167  158 112 89 24  24 24 22 21
 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*** indicates significant at 1 % , ** indicates significant at 5 % and *indicates significant at 10 % 
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 (c) Asian Economies       (d) Asian Crisis Economies 
 
Several papers like Gosselin and Parent (2005) and Edison (2003) have pointed out a 
structural break in the volume of reserves in 1997 due to the emergence of financial crisis 
in several Asian economies. As a result, in Column (IX) we focus only on the period 
from 1998 onwards. 
 
Figure 4 looks at a group of countries and compares the actual volume of reserve with the 
predicted demand for the same. Looking at the entire group of emerging markets, we find 
that actual demand for reserves is well above the predicted demand and the gap has 
increased in recent years. The difference between actual and predicted reserves for the 
emerging markets can be largely explained by the behaviour of both Asian and Latin 
American economies. The emerging Asian markets witnessed a strong upswing in the 
actual volume of reserves from 2002 onwards and it became greater than the predicted 
volume of reserves. On the other hand, in the Latin American emerging markets, actual 
volume of reserves has been trailing the predicted volume of reserves and the gap has 
more or less remained constant. When we focus on a select group of countries that were 
affected by the Asian crisis i.e., South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, we find that actual reserve accumulation was more or less in line with our 
model’s forecasts till 2002. However, since then these countries have witnessed a rapid 
increase in their actual reserve accumulation and the gap between actual and predicted 
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In Figure 5, we look at the reserve accumulation performance of some selected emerging 
markets in Asia and Latin America. Figure 5 brings out several interesting facts. There 
are five countries whose actual reserve accumulation was significantly higher than what 
our model predicted. These include India, China, Korea, Russia and Malaysia. By 2005, 
the excess reserve accumulation in these countries stood at $22 billion, $390 billion, $26 
billion, $83 billion and $13 billion, respectively.  
 
On the other hand, countries like Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand by 2005, had 
accumulated reserves close to the amount predicted by our model. Finally, only Brazil 
faced a shortfall in excess of $60 billion in 2005. 
 
6.  Cost of Reserve Holdings 
 
The benefits of reserve holdings have been outlined in Section 4. In the case of India, the 
dominant policy objectives in regard to international reserves include maintaining 
confidence in monetary and exchange rate policies, limiting external vulnerability by 
maintaining foreign currency liquidity to absorb shocks during the times of crisis, 
providing confidence in the market that external liabilities will always be met, and adding 
to the comfort of the market participants. Thus, in India lot of weight is put on the 
precautionary and self-reliance motive. A lot of this has to do with India’s historical 
experience. One of the causes of the crisis in mid-1991, apart from widening current 
account deficit and political uncertainty, was the loss of investor confidence. During this 
period commercial bank financing became difficult to obtain. Moreover, outflows began 
to take place on short-term external debt, as creditors became reluctant to roll over 
maturing loans. There was also a reversal of the strong inflows on non-resident Indian 
(NRI) deposits. Again, an immediate aftermath of the Pokhran explosions in 1998 was 
the imposition of sanctions, which curtailed India’s access to global financial market. 
Reddy (2002) points out that given these experiences an overwhelming desire for 
international reserve buildup is understandable. However, as highlighted by Lal et al. 
(2002), with current reserves being able to finance more than a year’s import and India 
doing exceptionally well on all reserve adequacy measures, continuation of such a policy 
is highly questionable given the high costs associated with such a policy, some of which 
are highlighted below. Lal et al. (2002) conclude that if capital flows were fully absorbed 
and invested, instead of being neutralized by building up of foreign reserves, growth 
could have been significantly higher. 
 
In India, international reserves are managed by the RBI in consultation with the 
Government of India. The main objectives of international reserve management are 
liquidity and safety with due attention being paid to the currency composition and 
duration of investment so that a substantial part can be converted to liquid form at a short 
notice. The framework for deployment of these international reserves is guided by the 
RBI Act, 1934, which requires that the investments be made in government securities of a 
foreign country maturing within 10 years, deposits be placed with other central banks, 
international commercial banks, IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the 
Bank of International Settlement following a multi-currency, multi-asset and multi-
market approach. Accordingly, as of September, 2007, out of the total foreign currency   16
assets of $240 billion, $67.2 billion was invested in securities, $137.4 billion was 
deposited with other central banks, BIS and IMF and $35.4 billion was in the form of 
deposits with foreign commercial banks. Thus, bulk of India’s reserves are held in the 
form of securities or deposits with foreign commercial banks and international 
organizations. 
 






Deposits with Foreign 
Central Banks,  BIS & IMF
46.28%








Source: Reserve Bank of India, Report on Foreign Exchange Reserves January 2008 
 
The strategy to focus on safety and liquidity at the expense of return has had strong 
implications for the rate of returns on investment of the international reserves. Given the 
low interest rate prevailing in most of industrialized countries like the US, Japan, and the 
Euro area, etc., the direct financial return on holdings of international reserves has been 
low. RBI (2007) points out that the central bank’s earning from the deployment of 
foreign currency assets increased to Rs. 35,153 crores in 2006-07 from Rs. 24,538 crores 
in 2005-06. This was primarily due to the increase in level of international reserves as 
well as a rise in global short-term interest rates, particularly in the US. However, the rate 
of earning on foreign currency assets and gold, after accounting for depreciation was only 
4.6% in 2006-07 and 3.9% in 2005-06. The inflation rate during these two years was 
around 5.43% and 4.38%, implying a real rate of return of -0.82% in 2006-07 and -0.48% 
in 2005-06.    17
 
Indeed, as shown in Figure 7, in recent years, the real rates of return on foreign currency 
assets have been largely negative. The low returns are due to the RBI’s cautious policies, 
which are guided by principles such as maintaining mark-to-market value and liquidity 
by taking minimal credit and market risk. The RBI limits itself to investing in short dated 
AAA-rated government debt securities.  
 
Figure 7: Rates of Return on Foreign Currency Assets 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics 
 
However, such low returns have raised several questions about the management of 
international reserves by the RBI. In particular, there has been a focus on calculating the 
cost of holding reserves. As shown in Section 5, India is one of the countries that has 
accumulated more reserves than is predicted by our model. In this section, we extend the 
analysis for India till 2007 by taking into account the behaviour of the explanatory 
variables for additional two years.
5. Figure 8 shows the result of the extended analysis. 
 
In 1998, India’s actual accumulation of reserves were slightly less than predicted and this 
trend continued till 2001 with the gap between the two reducing significantly during the 
latter part of the period. However, since then actual volume of reserves have overtaken 
the predicted volume, mainly due to a current account surplus in some of these years and 
rising net investment inflows. There was a marginal moderation in the growth rate of 
                                                 
5  We extend the data on India for 2005 and 2006 by looking at various publications of the Reserve Bank of 
India and Ministry of Finance, Government of India. We reestimated our model using the additional 
information. However, there were only marginal change in the coefficients and their significance level 
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reserves in 2005 but it picked up again in 2006. Increased opening up of trade and capital 
account along with financial deepening also meant that predicted volume of reserves also 
showed an upward trend but the gap between the two widened significantly and by Dec. 
2007 the amount of excess reserves stood well over $80 billion. 
 
























Below, we compute the cost of accumulating reserves instead of utilizing the resources to 
increase the productive capacity of the economy. All the costs are reported in terms of 
income foregone as well as loss in terms of percentage of the GDP. In the literature, 
different measures have been used to calculate the cost of hoarding reserves. We look at 
some of the important measures and calculate the costs of holding reserves in India. 
 
6.1  Cost in Terms of Physical Investment Foregone 
 
Several papers like Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992a) and Neely (2000) have pointed out 
that the opportunity cost of reserve holdings can be equated to the marginal product of 
capital. The underlying rationale being that resources that could have been used to 
increase the domestic capital have been employed in hoarding reserves. In such cases, the 
cost of holding reserves is given by the interest rate spread between the return on foreign 
currency assets and marginal product of capital, which is a proxy for the return on 
physical investment. We look at the opportunity cost in terms of actual income foregone 
as well as a percentage of the GDP.  
 
Typically, the marginal product of capital is seen as the inverse of the incremental 
capital-output ratio (ICOR), with the latter reflecting the amount of additional capital 
required to generate a unit increase in output. The growth rate of the real output y can be 







,                           (3) 
 
where Y is the real output, T is time and ∆ is the first difference operator. Multiplying the 
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 refers to the 
change in capital stock from one period to the next and is equal to the investment 





 reflects the increase in output brought about by an 
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=                  (6) 
Data on I and Y is obtained from Central Statistical Organization (CSO). Briefly, I and Y 
are Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) and GDP in constant prices, while y is 
the growth rate of the GDP in constant prices.  
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The opportunity cost of accumulating reserves is shown in Figure 9. It is clearly evident 
that India is losing a huge amount of revenue because of excessive reserve holdings. By 
diverting resources from physical investment and employing them for reserve 
accumulation, India lost nearly $13 billion, or 2.34% of the GDP in 2003-04. In the next 
couple of years the loss was slightly lower due to a higher return on the foreign currency 
assets. However, with a relatively low ICOR and hence a high marginal product of capital 
in 2006-07, the loss rose sharply to nearly $18 billion, or 2.16% of GDP. Thus, we find 
that in terms of physical investment foregone India is paying a substantial cost. 
 
6.2  Cost in Terms of Excess External Commercial Borrowing 
 
Another opportunity cost of holding reserves can be formulated in terms of short-term 
borrowings that the private sector has to undertake. A country living by the Greenspan-
Guidotti-IMF rule will increase reserves by the same amount by which the private sector 
increases in external short term liabilities. In a recent paper, Rodrik (2006) calculates the 
social cost of holding reserves based on this idea. 
 
Consider an economy that is made up of three entities – central bank, commercial banks 
and the private sector. The central bank is the sole holder of international reserves. It also 
holds domestic bonds that are issued by the private sector. The domestic bonds and 
international reserves comprise the assets of central banks. Among its liabilities are the 
reserves of the commercial banks, which the commercial banks have to keep with the 
central bank by law under the reserve ratio. Another liability of the central bank is the 
currency in the hand of the private sector. In our example, the central bank holds $2,000 
as international reserves and $3,000 in the form of domestic bonds. Total currency in 
circulation is $4,000 and reserves worth $1,000 of commercial banks are held by the 
central bank. 
 
The reserves are the assets of the commercial banks along with the domestic bonds that 
are issued by the private sector and held by these banks.
6 We assume that the commercial 
banks hold domestic bonds worth $9,000. The primary liabilities of the commercial banks 
are the checkable deposits which are assumed to be $10,000. Thus, we are assuming a 
reserve ratio of 0.1. Finally, the two main assets of the private sector are the checkable 
deposits and currency, while the main liabilities are the bonds, worth $12,000, that have 
been issued to the central and commercial banks. The private sector also has the option of 
borrowing short-term from the international market. 
 
Now suppose that this country is abiding by the Greenspan-Guidotti-IMF rule. The 
private sector takes a short-term loan from abroad for $1,000. The central bank, which 
has to increase its reserves by an equivalent amount, will purchase foreign currency 
worth $1,000 in the domestic market to invest in short-term foreign securities. Thus, its 
stock of international reserves will go up from $2,000 to $3,000. By selling domestic 
                                                 
6 Apart from holding bonds issued by the private sector the banks also make loans to the private sector. 
However, for our purpose a distinction between the two is not important and hence it is assumed that the 
banks do not make any loans. 
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currency to the private sector, the overall money supply has gone up by $1,000. To 
sterilize the effect of this intervention on the money supply, the central bank will sell 
some of the private sector domestic bonds it holds back to the private sector. Thus, it sells 
back $1,000 of domestic bonds issued by the private sector so its stock of domestic bonds 
decreases from $3,000 to $2,000. Similarly, due to this sell back, the value of domestic 
bonds outstanding for the private sector decrease from $12,000 to $11,000. 
 
Rodrik (2006) points out three consequences of such transactions. First, there is no net 
resource transfer from abroad as the increase in private sector’s liability is matched by an 
increase in central bank’s international reserves. Second, the short term borrowing does 
not increase the availability of liquid resources available to the private sector for 
investment. The decline in total amount of debt issued by the private sector through 
domestic bonds is equivalent to the rise in short-term foreign debt. Finally, aggregating 
the balance sheets of the various sectors, it can be seen that the economy has borrowed 
short-term abroad (at the domestic private sector’s cost of foreign borrowing) and has 
invested the proceeds in short-term foreign assets. 
 
In such a setting, the cost of holding reserves would be measured by the interest rate 
spread between the private sector’s cost of short-term borrowing abroad and the yield that 
the central bank earns on its liquid assets. Generally, there is no direct source of 
information on costs of short-term borrowing, most of which takes the form of 
commercial bank lending, information on which is generally not publicly available. In a 
recent article, Bhagwati (2006) pointed out that the average cost of short-term external 
commercial borrowings for the private sector is roughly about 3-month LIBOR+2.5%. 
Figure 10 shows the cost of hoarding excess reserves using this measure. 
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It can be seen that the cost of excess reserves has been increasing steadily and in 2006-07 
stood in excess of $2.5 billion, or 0.30% of the GDP. The sharp increase in the cost in 
2003-04, compared to the previous year, is largely because of the low return on foreign 
currency assets that year. On the other hand, the increase in cost in 2005-06 and 2006-07 
is primarily explained by a sharp rise in the average 3 month LIBOR rate to 4.11% and 
5.36%. As a result of monetary tightening in several industrialized countries, there was a 
sharp increase in the cost of borrowing. On the other hand, during this period the dollar 
had become marginally stronger thereby providing some boost to the returns on 
international reserves. 
 
6.3  Cost in Terms of Public Sector Borrowing 
 
The rising burden of public debt and gross fiscal deficit should be an issue of serious 
concern for the Indian economy. The combined domestic liabilities of the centre and 
states have increased from 40.52% of GDP in 1980-81 to 77.25% in 2006-07. Ahluwalia 
(2002) points out that the growth of public debt in India has equaled or exceeded that in 
Russia, Turkey and Argentina before these countries hit a crisis. Using yields on public 
debt issued domestically to evaluate debt sustainability, Kletzer (2004) provides a strong 
argument for a fiscal adjustment. Following Kletzer (2004) and Mohan (2002), we use 
the weighted average yield on central and state government securities to calculate the 
opportunity cost of hoarding reserves. The results are shown below in Figure 11. 
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It can be clearly seen that using the spread between interest rate on domestic government 
bonds and the yield on reserves, the cost is quite significant and in excess of $2.5 billion, 
or 0.31% of the GDP. Again, the sharp increase in the cost in 2003-04 is explained by the 
low yield on foreign assets. In contrast, the increase in cost by $1 billion between 2005-
06 and 2006-07 is explained by significant increase in the volume of excess reserves as 
well as an increase in the cost of borrowing for the public sector. The extent of this cost 
has been mitigated to an extent by the ability of the government to borrow at 
concessional rates. Since 1995-96, there has been a steady decline in the yield of central 
government securities along with a rise in maturity. However, this trend was reversed in 
2004-05 and 2005-06, when there was a sharp increase in interest rates. With global 
hardening of monetary policy, and opening up of the Indian economy to capital flows, 
domestic interest rates will have to align themselves with international rates. This would 
imply that the government’s ability to borrow at concessional terms might get severely 
eroded in the near future, thereby increasing the cost of hoarding reserves. 
 
6.4  Cost in Terms of Balance Sheet Risks 
 
Another cost of holding international reserves arises when the exchange rate adjusts. As 
shown above, the RBI has intervened actively in the currency market to keep the value of 
the Indian rupee low vis-à-vis the US dollar, which has resulted in accumulation of the 
dollar. However, the central bank can only delay the inevitable process of appreciation 
and can not prevent it. This was also observed in the case of India. After trying to keep 
the value of the rupee around Rs. 48 during 2001-02, the RBI allowed the Indian 
currency to appreciate. As a result, the value of dollar fell from Rs. 49.03 in May 2002 to 
Rs. 45.32 in October 2003. This adjustment would imply that there was a sharp fall in the 
rupee value of India’s international reserves.  For example, international reserves worth 
$1 billion, which was valued at Rs. 490.3 crores in May 2002, was worth only Rs. 453.2 
crores in October 2003 – a loss of Rs. 37 crores. Similarly, the recent appreciation of the 
Indian rupee has resulted in a significant fall in the valuation of reserves in domestic 
currency.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the cost of holding excess reserves. 
Using empirical methods we formulate a comprehensive measure of reserve adequacy to 
calculate the volume of excess reserves in several emerging markets, including India. 
This is in contrast to most of the existing literature, which generally uses a single reserve 
adequacy measure to calculate excess reserves. 
 
Using the comprehensive measure of reserve adequacy we find that overall emerging 
markets have outperformed in their reserve accumulation objective compared to the 
predictions of our model. This result is primarily driven by the Asian economies which 
have amassed far more reserves than suggested by our model. Among these, the Asian 
emerging markets that suffered the adverse impact of the Asian crisis have significantly 
increased their reserve accumulation endeavours compared to the predictions of the   24
model. On the other hand, Latin American economies fall well short of the levels 
predicted by our model.  
 
Looking at individual countries we find that Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have 
accumulated reserves close to the amount predicted by our model. On the other hand, 
Brazil’s reserve accumulation efforts have fallen well short of our model’s prediction. 
Finally, China, India, Korea, Russia and Malaysia had accumulated significantly more 
reserves than predicted by our model.  
 
Next, focusing on India, we find that by 2007 India had accumulated more than $80 
billion of excess reserves. We impute the costs of holding these reserves by considering 
various alternative use of the resources employed in building up reserves. The cost is 
substantial across all specifications, both in terms of actual income foregone as well as 
loss in terms of percentage of the GDP. India is losing more than 2% of its GDP by 
accumulating reserves instead of employing resources to increase the physical capital of 
the economy. Even if the resources absorbed in reserve accumulation were utilized to 
reduce the private sector’s external commercial borrowing or public sector debt, India 
could gain more than 0.3% of the GDP.  
 
Alternatively, RBI could well do to maintain an adequate level of reserves in the form of 
low return but highly liquid assets for meeting its needs like current account financing, 
meeting short term external debt obligations, restraining excessive volatility in the 
exchange rate etc., and park the excess reserves in an account with an objective of 
maximizing returns subject to acceptable risks. The funds in such an account could be 
profitably invested in non-treasury based assets like equities, private equity company and 
real estate, which are associated with greater market risk and hence correspondingly 
higher returns. 
 
Such investments are not new as Singapore and Korea have been doing this for a number 
of years now. Singapore’s Government Investment Corp. (GIC) and Korea Investment 
Corp. (KIC) in Korea have been investing a large part of their reserves in a variety of top-
grade corporate and sovereign bonds, equities and real estate holdings spread across the 
globe. By investing $3 billion of its reserves with Blackstone, China has also initiated the 
move away from US treasuries to more profitable equity holdings. Other countries like 
Malaysia and Thailand are also examining ways of lowering their exposure to low yield 
US bonds.   25
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